Implementing Anti Ransomware Group Policy
Configures Windows Group Policy Objects (GPO) to prevent ransomware execution and limit its spread. Implements AppLocker rules, Software Restriction Policies, Controlled Folder Access, attack surface reduction rules, and network protection settings. Activates for requests involving Windows GPO hardening against ransomware, AppLocker configuration, Controlled Folder Access setup, or endpoint protection via Group Policy.
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# Implementing Anti-Ransomware Group Policy ## When to Use - Hardening a Windows Active Directory environment against ransomware execution and propagation - Implementing defense-in-depth by blocking ransomware execution paths via Group Policy - Configuring AppLocker or WDAC rules to prevent unauthorized executables from running in user-writable directories - Enabling Controlled Folder Access to protect critical directories from unauthorized file modifications - Restricting lateral movement vectors (RDP, SMB, WMI) that ransomware uses to spread across the domain **Do not use** as a standalone ransomware defense. GPO settings complement but do not replace endpoint detection, backups, network segmentation, and user awareness training. ## Prerequisites - Windows Server 2016+ Active Directory environment with Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) - Domain Admin or Group Policy Creator Owners privileges - Windows 10/11 Enterprise or Education (required for AppLocker and WDAC) - Microsoft Defender Antivirus enabled (required for Controlled Folder Access and ASR rules) - Python 3.8+ for audit script that validates GPO compliance - Test OU for validating GPO settings before domain-wide deployment ## Workflow ### Step 1: Block Ransomware Execution Paths with AppLocker Configure AppLocker to prevent executables from running in common ransomware staging locations: ``` AppLocker GPO Path: Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Application Control Policies → AppLocker Key Rules: ━━━━━━━━━ 1. DENY executable rules for user-writable paths: - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Temp\* (email attachment extraction) - %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\* (CryptoLocker staging) - %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\* (web downloads) - %TEMP%\* (temporary extraction) - %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\* (social engineering drops) 2. ALLOW default rules: - C:\Windows\* (signed by Microsoft) - C:\Program Files\* and C:\Program Files (x86)\* - Administrator group: all paths 3. Enable Application Identity service: Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings → Security Settings → System Services → Application Identity → Automatic ``` ### Step 2: Enable Controlled Folder Access Protect critical directories from unauthorized modification: ``` Controlled Folder Access GPO Path: Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Windows Components → Microsoft Defender Antivirus → Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard → Controlled Folder Access Settings: ━━━━━━━━━ 1. Configure Controlled folder access: Enabled → Block mode 2. Configure protected folders: Add custom paths - \\fileserver\shares\finance - \\fileserver\shares\hr - C:\Users\*\Documents - C:\Users\*\Desktop 3. Configure allowed applications: Whitelist trusted apps - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\* - C:\Program Files\Adobe\* - Line-of-business applications Default protected folders (automatic): Documents, Pictures, Videos, Music, Desktop, Favorites ``` ### Step 3: Configure Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) Rules Enable ASR rules that target ransomware delivery mechanisms: ``` ASR Rules GPO Path: Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Windows Components → Microsoft Defender Antivirus → Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard → Attack Surface Reduction Critical ASR Rules for Ransomware Prevention: ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ GUID Rule BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550 Block executable content from email D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A Block Office apps from creating child processes 3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899 Block Office apps from creating executable content 75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84 Block Office apps from injecting into processes D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D Block JavaScript/VBScript from launching downloads 5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC Block execution of obfuscated scripts 92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B Block Win32 API calls from Office macros 01443614-CD74-433A-B99E-2ECDC07BFC25 Block executable files unless they meet prevalence criteria Set each rule to: Block (1) or Audit (2) for initial testing ``` ### Step 4: Restrict Lateral Movement Vectors Lock down SMB, RDP, and WMI to limit ransomware propagation: ``` Network Restrictions: ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 1. Disable SMBv1: Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Network → Lanman Workstation → Enable insecure guest logons: Disabled Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → MS Security Guide → Configure SMBv1 server: Disabled 2. Restrict Remote Desktop: Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Windows Components → Remote Desktop Services → Remote Desktop Session Host → Connections → Allow users to connect remotely: Disabled (or restricted to specific groups) 3. Disable remote WMI: Windows Firewall → Inbound Rules → Block Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) inbound 4. Disable AutoPlay/AutoRun: Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Windows Components → AutoPlay Policies → Turn off AutoPlay: Enabled (All drives) 5. Disable PowerShell remoting for non-admin users: Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Windows Components → Windows PowerShell → Turn on Script Execution: Allow only signed scripts ``` ### Step 5: Audit and Validate GPO Compliance Verify that GPO settings are applied correctly across the domain: ```powershell # Check GPO application on endpoint gpresult /r /scope:computer # Verify AppLocker rules Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | Select-Object -ExpandProperty RuleCollections # Check Controlled Folder Access status Get-MpPreference | Select-Object EnableControlledFolderAccess # List protected folders Get-MpPreference | Select-Object -ExpandProperty ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders # Check ASR rules Get-MpPreference | Select-Object -ExpandProperty AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids Get-MpPreference | Select-Object -ExpandProperty AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions ``` ## Verification - Run `gpresult /r` on test endpoints to confirm GPO application - Attempt to run an executable from `%AppData%\Temp` to verify AppLocker blocks it - Modify a file in a protected folder from an unlisted application to confirm CFA blocks it - Test ASR rules by opening a macro-enabled document and verifying child process blocking - Validate that legitimate applications in the allowlist still function correctly - Check Windows Event Log for AppLocker events (Event IDs 8003, 8004) and CFA events (1123, 1124) ## Key Concepts | Term | Definition | |------|------------| | **AppLocker** | Windows application control feature that restricts which executables, scripts, and DLLs users can run based on publisher, path, or hash rules | | **Controlled Folder Access** | Microsoft Defender feature that prevents untrusted applications from modifying files in protected directories | | **Attack Surface Reduction (ASR)** | Set of rules in Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard that block specific attack behaviors like Office macro child processes | | **Software Restriction Policies (SRP)** | Legacy Windows feature (deprecated in Win 11) for restricting executables; replaced by AppLocker and WDAC | | **WDAC** | Windows Defender Application Control; the successor to AppLocker with stronger enforcement using code integrity policies | ## Tools & Systems - **Group Policy Management Console (GPMC)**: Primary tool for creating and managing GPOs in Active Directory - **AppLocker**: Built-in Windows application whitelisting and blacklisting engine - **Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard**: Suite including CFA, ASR rules, and Network Protection - **GPResult**: Command-line tool for verifying GPO application status on endpoints - **PowerShell Get-MpPreference**: Cmdlet for querying Microsoft Defender configuration including ASR and CFA status
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